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Abstract 
In 1991, the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was 
between 35%  and 70%. At the end of 2001, it is below 8%. We setup a small 
structural macro model of these economies to explain the process of disinflation. 
Contrary to a widespread skepticism,  which permeated a large part of previous 
research on these issues, we show that a simple open macroeconomic model, along 
the lines of Svensson (2000, Journal of International  Economics), with forward-
looking inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately characterize the 
relationship between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the exchange 
rate during the course of transition.  
We use the estimated models to interpret the main features of monetary policy in 
each country and identify the channels of policy transmission. We characterize the 
policy rules and assess  the relative importance of the interest rate channel (on 
aggregate demand) and the exchange rate channel (which affects both aggregate 
demand and supply) in determining the path of (dis)inflation. In the same context, we 
also tentatively analyze the consequences of attempting a faster path of disinflation. 
Finally, we evaluate the appropriateness of the inflation targeting framework which 
has been adopted recently in all three countries, and discuss to what extent  it 
represents a discontinuity with the past. 
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Abstract 
In 1991, the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was between 35% 
and 70%. At the end of 2001, it is below 8%. We setup a small structural macro model of 
these economies to explain the process of disinflation. Contrary to a widespread skepticism, 
which permeated a large part of previous research on these issues, we show that a simple 
open macroeconomic model, along the lines of Svensson (2000, Journal of International 
Economics), with forward-looking inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately 
characterize the relationship between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the 
exchange rate during the course of transition.  
We use the estimated models to interpret the main features of monetary policy in each 
country and identify the channels of policy transmission. We characterize the policy rules and 
assess the relative importance of the interest rate channel (on aggregate demand) and the 
exchange rate channel (which affects both aggregate demand and supply) in determining the 
path of (dis)inflation. In the same context, we also tentatively analyze the consequences of 
attempting a faster path of disinflation. Finally, we evaluate the appropriateness of the 
inflation targeting framework which has been adopted recently in all three countries, and 
discuss to what extent it represents a discontinuity with the past.  
JEL classification: E31, E52, F41, P24. 
Keywords: Disinflation policy, Interest rate rules, Inflation targeting, Transition economies, 
Small open-economy macro models.  
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the workshop “The Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone” organised by 




1.  Introduction 
During the last decade, several economies in transition have achieved both monetary and real 
stabilization. In many cases, this has been a remarkable story of success. In this paper we 
study the process of disinflation in three countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
(CHP). Table 1 illustrates some essential aspects of the stabilization process.2 Partly in 
retrospect and partly looking forward, it seems natural to pose three questions: (i) how did 
monetary stabilization take place? (ii) could it have been faster or, instead, would a more 
gradualist approach have reduced the costs of stabilization? (iii) once the process of 
disinflation has been completed, how should the strategy of monetary policy be adjusted, in 
particular to take into account the aspiration to EU and EMU membership? 
  Table 1 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland 
(Annual averages)  1991  2000  1991  2000  1991  2000 
Real GDP  
growth 
-11.6  +2.9  -11.9  +5.2  -7.0  +4.0 
Unemployment  
Rate 
4.1  8.8  9.8  5.7  11.8  15.0 
Inflation  
(CPI) 
56.6  3.9  35.0  9.8  70.3  10.1 
Central Govt.  
Surplus /Deficit 
-2.0  -2.4  -4.6  -2.9  -3.8  -2.2 
Curr. Units per euro  
( D% 1999.10-2001.10)° 
-6.8  -0.85  -14.8 
° minus sign = appreciation of local currency 
Source: Focus on Transition (2001) and National Central Banks. 
 
On the face of it, the first question is the hardest to answer. Re-constructing and interpreting 
the history of disinflation in those countries may seem an adventurous task. Reading the 
official policy reports of some central banks during the past decade, one often encountered 
statements implying that: (i) monetary aggregates behaved unpredictably, (ii) the relation 
between money and growth was unpredictable; (iii) price indexes were unreliable and 
essentially responded to domestic cost pressures ... (iv) in addition to being heavily distorted 
                                                 
2 Of course, macro data only tell the surface of the story. Underlying the macro framework, there is a 
parallel and deeper story of structural changes, towards becoming "functioning market economies". In 
this respect, the recent "Strategy paper on enlargement" of the EU 




by changes in administrative prices; (v) changes in interest rates did not significantly affect in 
a negative way domestic demand ... (vi) but might instead induce undesirable appreciations of 
the exchange rate ... (vii) thus fuelling  into inflation (sic) either through the induced currency 
inflows or  (viii) via wealth effects and aggregate demand pressures.  What might monetary 
policy do in such circumstances? Our answer is that things were not necessarily as bleak as 
they were described, and that throughout the years of transition monetary policy has been a 
powerful and reliable tool for controlling aggregate demand. Thus, we build an “orthodox” 
model3 of monetary policy, focusing in particular on the role of interest and exchange rates in 
the transmission mechanism, from 19914 to 2000. We show that such a model adequately 
characterizes the path of macro variables in CHP, and that the estimated equations are "well 
behaved" and reasonably stable across time. By appropriately setting a moderately restrictive 
path for nominal and hence for real interest rates and thus inducing a controlled appreciation 
of the real exchange rates, monetary authorities have been able to gradually steer their 
economies towards single-digit inflation, while containing the output costs of the 
stabilization. On the basis of the estimated model, we are then also able to answer the two 
remaining questions, on the choice of the speed of disinflation and how to adjust the policy 
strategy once disinflation has been completed.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the process of macroeconomic 
stabilization in the three countries. Section 3 presents a small structural macro model of an 
open economy, which is the starting point for the empirical part of the paper. The estimated 
models for the three countries are presented in section 4, and out of sample simulations in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
"functioning market economies ... [which] should be able to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union in the near term". 
3 We use “orthodox” in reference to models were price-level determination embodies some degree of 
stickiness and hence inflation is determined by the interplay of aggregate demand and supply, as in the 
theoretical models proposed e.g. by Buiter (1980) and Svensson (1997; 2000), and the derived 
empirical models of Rudebusch and Svensson  (1999), and  Favero and Rovelli (2002).  




Monetary strategy and stabilization policy in the three countries 
2.1  Three roads, one ending 
For the best part of the last decade, the three countries examined have been actively 
managing their exchange rates, although in different ways.5  
The Czech Republic (until the end of 1992, Czechoslovakia) introduced a currency peg in 
1991, which it formally abandoned at the end of 1997, after a series of speculative attacks. 
Currently, the exchange rate is in free float, although the euro is informally used as a 
reference currency. In December 1997, the Czech National Bank (CNB) began to announce 
inflation targets6. Throughout the period, the exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM has been almost 
constant in nominal terms: it was 18.3 koruna to 1 DM in January 1991, and 17.0 in 
November 2001, with a maximum revaluation at 16.9 in February 1997, and a minimum at 
19.5 in December 1997 (monthly averages). The real effective exchange rate, accordingly, has 
been under constant appreciation. In the CNB own calculations, it appreciated by 29.5% in 
CPI terms between January 1993 and November 2001, and 13.9% in PPI terms. The explicit 
adoption of inflation targets has not apparently had any impact on the behavior of the 
exchange rate (apart from, possibly, helping to diffuse speculative pressures). 
Hungary adopted a crawling band since March 1995, with the rate of depreciation being 
gradually reduced as disinflation proceeded. The rate of crawl, initially at 1.9% per month, 
was gradually reduced to 0.3% per month in April 2000, and finally to 0.2% in April 2001. At 
almost the same time (May 2001) the fluctuation band was widened (–15%), rendering de facto 
irrelevant the rate of crawl. Immediately after, following also the approval of a new Bank Act 
(July 2001) the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has begun to announce quantitative targets 
for inflation.7  
Also Poland, similarly to the Czech Republic, started off adopting a currency peg in 1990. 
The commitment to fix the exchange rate did not last long, and in October 1991 Poland 
                                                 
5 Recent surveys and interpretations of this period, with complementary perspectives, are Bofinger 
and Wollmershaeuser (2000), Kutan and Brada (2000), Orlowski (2000),  
6  Initially, the target was formulated with reference to "net inflation", calculated by the Czech 
Statistical Office (CSO) as the growth of prices in the unregulated part of the consumer basket 
adjusted for changes in indirect taxes and for abolition of subsidies. In April 2001, the target was 
redefined as "headline inflation" (i.e. growth in the total consumer price index). Targets are set for 
several years ahead, currently until 2005. 




moved to a crawling peg system. The pre-announced monthly rate of crawl was gradually 
reduced, and then also transformed (May 1995) into a crawling band regime, with a wide 
(–7%) band. The band was further widened in the next years (up to 15% in March 1999) and 
finally abandoned, giving way to a free float, in April 2000. While pursuing its exchange rate 
policy, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) nevertheless defined its official strategy in terms 
of other variables: monetary targets until 1997; direct inflation targeting since October 1998.  
Summing up, currently, the exchange rate regime of the three countries may be described as a 
free float (although the –15% band is still valid, though obviously not binding, for Hungary) 
together with inflation targeting. This raises the question, to what extent the new policy 
framework signals a discontinuity with the past? We turn to this issue in the next sub-section. 
2.2  Inflation Targeting: is it a break from the past? 
First, we must define what we mean by inflation targeting (IT). Recent literature has analyzed 
in depth both the pre-requisites and the specific characterization of an IT policy strategy, also 
in the context of emerging economies. Mishkin (2000) suggests that an IT strategy 
encompasses five main elements: (i) announcement of targets, (ii) institutional commitment to 
price stability, (iii) information-inclusive strategy (iv) transparency of strategy (v) 
accountability of central bank for attaining the stated objectives. Amato and Gerlach (2001) 
observe that these criteria, while they capture the spirit of IT, "are not very helpful in formally 
defining this policy framework" and suggest that "IT is best thought of as a range of 
strategies". This observation is correct, and we think that it should not be interpreted as a 
criticism of Mishkin. The point is that almost all  "strategies" which are not formulated in 
terms of a stringent rule8 should best be thought of as defining the policy framework chosen by  
the central bank with respect to other macro agents (the government, financial markets, price 
and wage setters). For instance, as von Hagen (1999, p.699-700) succinctly states with respect 
to the monetary-targeting strategy of the Bundesbank: "Money growth targeting served the 
Bundesbank a number of politico-economic functions: It marked the end of the old regime 
where the Bank was powerless to control monetary conditions in Germany; it defined the 
central bank's monetary policy goal and its role in the macro economic policy game; and it 
served as a focal point in council meetings, strengthening the pursuit of a consistent monetary 
                                                 
8 We can think of only three examples of  stringent rules: a k -percent rule of money growth; a 
commitment to fix the exchange rate around a constant value, with a narrow band; the adoption of a 
currency board. All other policy strategies, even if they can be formulated in terms of rules, always 
involve a considerable discretion in the processing of upcoming information, and hence also with 




policy geared at price stability over time". We suggest that IT strategies for emerging 
countries, and for CHP in particular, have analogous politico-economic functions. In 
particular, the adoption of an IT strategy by CHP may be interpreted as a clear signal that:  
1.  the central bank is committed to price stability  
2.  the goal of price stability is in close sight   
3.  the central bank is independent of the government and other actors on the 
macroeconomic scene, who might in their turn be engaged in the pursuit of other 
goals9 
4.  the financial position of the government is sustainable without recourse to 
monetization10 
5.  the exchange rate policy is not (or not any longer) to be seen as the main anchor (or 
intermediate target) of the disinflation policy - in particular, since the latter has been 
almost completed, the pre-announcement of a rate of crawl no longer plays a 
central role in the strategy for disinflation11, which in turn is a pre-requisite that ... 
6.  inflation forecasts have become the main intermediate target, the announcement of 
which helps to anchor inflation expectations 
7.  the central bank will adopt an "all-inclusive" information stance, looking at the 
determinants of inflation within a structured and broad analytical framework, 
without placing specific emphasis on the role of monetary aggregates12 
We think that these seven "signals" convey the role and purpose of IT in most emerging 
countries, and also with specific reference to CHP.13 However, for those signals to be 
meaningful, some prerequisites must be satisfied. Amato and Gerlach (2001) list four such 
                                                 
9   The independence of the three central banks is assessed in Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2001).  
10  Hochreiter and Rovelli (2001) discuss this point in greater detail. After examining the relations 
between government finances and monetary policy in CHP, they conclude:  "In all three countries, 
seigniorage substantially declined in the observation period [1992-99]. It is now negligible in the 
Czech Republic; around 1% of GDP in Hungary. Although it has increased to almost 4% of GDP in 
Poland, this is a temporary effect due to the attempt to reduce inflation during 1998 by increasing the 
level of domestic real rates of interest. Thus, in general, all our data indicate that monetary discipline 
and independence have been strengthened during the period which we have examined." 
11  For instance, in Hungary "the announcement of the rate of devaluation helped in developing the 
forward-looking nature of expectations" (NBH, 1999a, p. 17) and "by periodically lowering the 
devaluation rate the mechanism has been contributing successfully to the gradual reduction in the 
inflation differential between Hungary and its trading partners..."  (NBH, 1999b, p. 13).  See also 
Szapary and Jakab (1998). 
12  An examination of the Inflation Report published by each central bank would give support to this 




preconditions: (i) central bank independence; (ii) sound fiscal policy; (iii) resiliency of the 
economy to changes in interest and exchange rates; (iv) need for econometric models of the 
inflation process and the transmission mechanism. They also point out, however, that these 
preconditions "apply equally well to any other monetary policy framework" (id., p.5). This 
observation should imply that, to the extent that monetary policy has been successful in 
bringing about disinflation, the above prerequisites must have been satisfied also in the past, 
at least to some extent. In fact, this seems to have been the case: as a proof by contradiction, for 
instance, several authors have pointed out that temporary s etbacks in the process of 
stabilization have occurred at times when fiscal policy has behaved inconsistently, and central 
bank independence has been side-stepped.14 
But what about the econometric evidence on the inflation process and the transmission 
mechanism? On the one hand, it is easy to point out that the size and sophistication of money 
and financial markets, and the composition and quality of bank portfolios, have improved 
considerably in the course of transition. Thus the channels of transmission must have evolved 
somewhat. Also, the productive sector has been subject to considerable restructuring, so that 
in principle one might expect to find some evidence of instability in the equations that reflect 
the pricing-setting  behavior of producers or their sensitivity to the cost of capital. On the 
other hand, it is also true that in each of the three countries the basic structure of money 
markets was already in place at the beginning of the 1990s, and interest rates have been 
liberalized towards the beginning of the decade. Hence, the extent to which the 
macroeconomic features of the transmission mechanism have remained stable, in a broad 
sense, throughout this period is largely an empirical question. In a previous paper on Hungary 
(Golinelli and Rovelli, 2001), we conducted several tests of parameter stability, based upon a 
small structural model, similar to the one presented in the next section. Our conclusion was 
that most coefficients do not change significantly when estimated over different sub-samples 
within 1991-99, and in particular that "the crucial parameters of the exchange-rate and 
interest rate equations are clearly stable across the two sub-samples".15 In the rest of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 Kutan and Brada (2000) express a different opinion on this issue. However their paper examines 
data and facts only up to the first half of 1999, hence it is possible that some of their reservations 
would not apply any longer today. 
14 For instance, see Begg (1998) for the fiscal policy reasons behind the Czech crisis of 1997.  
15 In less structured modeling frameworks, Siklos and Abel (2001) for Hungary and Christoffersen, 
Sloek and Wescott (2001) for Poland provide evidence in favor of a significant relation between 
inflation and monetary instruments. Also, Orlowski (2001) provides some preliminary evidence on the 
effectiveness of the adoption of IT strategies in changing the dynamics of the inflation process in the 




paper, we shall propose and evaluate three parallel small macro models of the transmission 
mechanism, which will allow us to evaluate the main aspects of the transmission mechanism 
in CHP. This will help us to fulfill three tasks: 
•  to characterize the process of disinflation which has taken place in the last decade 
•  to understand t o what extent the adoption of IT represents a discontinuity with the 
previous strategies of monetary policy 
•  to assess whether all the preconditions for a successful strategy of IT are in place in CHP.  
 
3.  Model specification 
Our approach to modeling the t ransmission mechanism of monetary policy may be 
synthesized as follows. By controlling the evolution of nominal interest rates (for given 
foreign rates, and taking into account the required risk premium) the central bank also 
influences the path of the nominal exchange rate and may induce a pressure towards a desired 
degree of real appreciation.16 Both directly (via the chosen level of the real interest rate) and 
indirectly (through the induced real exchange-rate appreciation), the central bank may thus 
influence the evolution of aggregate demand and of the inflation rate. As a result, taking into 
account the lag structure with which these effects take place in practice, a policy of persistent 
high real interest rates will lead to a process of gradual disinflation. This view of the 
transmission mechanism places domestic interest rates at the center of the analysis, and is 
compatible in principle with different strategies concerning the exchange rate policy. This 
raises the question of how to describe the policy rule(s) for setting interest rates, which the 
monetary authorities have followed in each country during the last decade. In particular we  
suggest that the choice of one or the other policy (or regime) with respect to the exchange 
rate, will influence the relative importance of different channels of transmission, but will not 
alter in a fundamental way the structure of the underlying macroeconomic relations.17  
                                                 
16 Normally, one would expect that the rate of real appreciation is maximum under policies that peg 
the nominal exchange rate, and null under policies that result in a nominal depreciation equal to the 
inflation differential.  Occasionally, both boundaries may be overshot. This happens either because 
(despite the inflation differential) the nominal exchange rate appreciates under speculative pressures, or 
when it depreciates faster than inflation, as during a currency run. See also the discussion in Bofinger and 
Wollmershaeuser (2000). 
17 This point is well expressed also in a recent quotation from the NBH, which also stands in sharp 
contrast to the skepticism which emanated from many previous statements from the same source: 
“The objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price stability. The central bank’s 




According to this view, we follow the modeling strategy suggested by Svensson (2000) for a 
small open economy. Our model includes four structural equations:  
•  aggregate supply, normalized in the rate of inflation (AS) 
•  aggregate demand, normalized in the output gap (AD) 
•  uncovered interest parity, augmented by a risk premium, normalized in the current 
exchange rate (ER)18 
•  a policy rule  for setting the domestic interest rate (IR). 
External shocks to the model originate for foreign prices, foreign demand and foreign interest 
rates. Equations AS, AD, and IR are specified with general lag structures. All four equations 
are affected by different white noise shocks  ej (j = 1, 2, 3, 4). In the estimation, lags have 
been selected by imposing data admissible restrictions (see section 4).  
In the AS equation (1), domestic inflation (Dp) is driven by the long-run purchasing power 
parity condition [e + p* - p], where e  is the log-level of the nominal exchange rate,  p*  and  
p  are the foreign and the domestic log-levels of prices. In the short-run, domestic inflation is 
also affected by the output gap (y) and the foreign inflation rate: 
Dpt  =  a0  +  a1(L) Dpt-1  +  a2(L) Dp
*
t  +  a3(L) yt-1  +   
    a4(L) [et-1 + p
*
t-1 - pt-1]  +  e1t              (1) 
In the AD equation (2), the output gap is linked to the expected real interest rate [i – E Dp], 
the real exchange rate, the growth of world demand (Dw), and a measure of the fiscal impulse 
(bg): 
yt  =  b0  +  b1(L) yt-1  +  b2(L) [it-1 – Et-1 Dpt]  +   
    b3(L) [et-1 + p
*
t-1 - pt-1]  +  b4(L) Dwt  +  b5(L) bg t-1 + e2 t   (2) 
The ER equation (3) is based on the UIP hypothesis, augmented with a stationary risk 
premium, jt, modeled as an AR1 process: 
                                                                                                                                                   
influence inflation partly through the exchange rate’s direct disciplinary power over price increases 
and partly through the effect of the real exchange rate and real interest rates on aggregate demand. In 
small countries such as Hungary, the exchange rate channel is the central bank’s most powerful and 
fastest means of influencing domestic prices. Therefore, the exchange rate will retain its prominent 
role even though the Bank has much smaller power over the path of the exchange rate than under the 
previous narrow-band regime. In the future, if the National Bank wishes to influence the exchange 
rate in support of the inflation target, it will do so primarily by changing interest rates”. (National Bank 




et  =  Et et+1  -  (it - i
*
t)  +  jt ,    were:  jt  = g0 + g jt-1  +  e3 t    (3) 
The IR equation (4) defines the nominal interest rate differential (i – i*) in terms of a forward-
looking dynamic19 Taylor rule ; e4 are random shocks to the interest rate differential.   
it - i
*
t  =  d0 + d1(L) (it-1 - i
*
t-1)  +   
d2 Et (Dpt+1 - Dp
*
t+1)  +  d3 Et yt+1  +  e4t        (4) 
All equations are jointly estimated and simulated with model-consistent expectations. If the 
variables in each equation are stationary or cointegrated, then we may obtain statistical 
estimates of the steady state solution of the model, conditional on the steady state values of 
the foreign variables.  
In the out-of-sample simulations, we s tudy the path to nominal convergence. To ensure 
convergence, we impose the following long-run restrictions of the rate of domestic inflation, 
on the nominal exchange and interest rates and on the risk premium: 
Dp = Dp
*  De = 0  i  =  i
*  g0 = d0 = 0 
Notice that this also implies a long run condition on the constancy of the real exchange rate.20  
4.  Estimation method and results 
The data set for each country includes seven variables, measured quarterly from 1991.1 to 
2001.1 (1993.1 to 2001.1 for the Czech Republic). All variables except interest rates and the 
ratio of capacity utilization are in logs. We use the CPI for domestic prices, p; and the capacity 
utilization ratio to measure the output gap, y.21 Inflation (Dpt , Dp*t) and exchange rate changes 
are measured as annualized quarterly changes; for output we use quarterly changes. The 
domestic interest rate, i, is the three-month Treasury Bill rate. The nominal exchange rate, e, is 
the weighted average of the exchange rate of each country against the DM (or ECU) and the 
USD, with variable weights chosen according to the objectives or targets indicated by each 
national central bank. Foreign prices, p
*, are the weighted average of the German and US CPI, 
                                                                                                                                                   
18 Strictly speaking, this specification may apply also to the case of an exchange rate peg with a given 
fluctuation band.  
19 Goodfriend (1987) and Walsh (1998, ch.10) rationalize the inclusion of autoregressive parameters in 
interest rate rules with reference to the authorities' desire to smooth the path of interest rates. 
20 In addition, we shall also need to specify a terminal condition on the value of the exchange rate, in 




with weights chosen according to the same criterion as for exchange rates; similarly, the 
foreign interest rate,  i
*, is the weighted average of German and US short-term rates 
(respectively, the call money rate for Germany and the rate on 3-mos. CD for the US). World 
demand, w, is proxied by the index of world trade in manufactures. Data sources and more 
detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 1.22 
 The model is estimated by three stages least squares (3SLS).23 Hsiao (1997) shows that the 
structural equation approach for estimation and testing is still valid, even when some 
regressors are non stationary, provided they are cointegrated24. In Appendix 2 we show that 
these requirements are satisfied for all the non-stationary variables in the set of regressors.  
The estimated equations track the data  quite well, and their statistical performance is 
satisfying, despite the short sample of observations. At a general level, a strong check on the 
validity of the model is the fact that very similar specifications emerge independently for the 
three countries in our data set. In the Appendix 3 we report results of the mis-specification 
and stability tests, and plots of the estimated equations. 
For ease of comparison across countries, we discuss the results of estimation for each 
equation in turn. In Table 2 we show the estimates of the aggregate supply equation. For each 
country, the pressure on domestic inflation from aggregate demand and the real exchange 
rate are well identified.  
A homogeneity condition has been imposed in each equation, to ensure that domestic 
inflation converges to the foreign rate in the long run. This restriction is easily not rejected for 
the Czech R. (c2 = 0.431, P-value = 0.512), and Hungary (c2 = 0.579, P-value = 0.447). For 
Poland, the restriction is rejected at 5% but not rejected at 1% (c2 = 5.04, P-value = 0.025). 
                                                                                                                                                   
21 The time series properties of capacity utilization are quite similar to those of an HP filter on GDP. 
In particular, the two variables indicate a very similar evolution of the business cycle. These 
comparisons are available on request from the authors. 
22  Notice that  D indicates the difference between two consecutive quarters and  D4 indicates the 
difference between the same quarter in two consecutive years. In all cases, inflation rates are defined 
on an annual scale, i.e. Dpt-k+1 ” 4 (pt-k+1 - pt-k ). Et-k  measures expectations formed at time t-k. 
23 The alternative GMM estimator brings efficiency gains in presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation but asymptotically it becomes equivalent to 3SLS if the disturbances are white noise 
(see the diagnostic tests on the residuals, in Appendix 3). In addition, if the disturbances are also 
normally distributed, 3SLS has the same asymptotic distribution as the (asymptotically efficient) full 
information maximum likelihood estimator. Finally, GMM methods are more data demanding than 
3SLS; in our case they are often infeasible because of small samples.  
24 Hsiao (1997, p. 395) concludes that “in a structural approach one still needs to worry about the 
issues of identification and simultaneity bias, but one need not worry about the issues of non-




For the Czech R. we may also identify the level of long-run capacity utilization at which 
inflation converges to the foreign rate. For the other two countries, the condition for nominal 
convergence is simply Dpt - Dp*t = Dyt = 0, which may be satisfied at any constant rate of 
capacity utilization.  
Similarly, note that for the Czech R. and Hungary, the level of the real exchange rate affects 
domestic inflation. For Poland, we find a direct link between inflation and changes in the 
nominal exchange rate. This implies that, in the long run solution for the Czech R. and 
Hungary, the inflation differential attains zero when the real exchange rate attains its long run 
equilibrium value, whereas for Poland the convergence condition is simply Dpt - Dp*t = Det = 
0, which may be verified at any level of the real exchange rate. 
We observe that the effect of the real exchange rate appreciation is much more direct (with 
an impact coefficient of 0.695 on inflation) in the case of the Czech Republic, which 
corresponds well to the fact that the CNB consistently placed a greater emphasis, relative to 
the other two central banks, on the role of real exchange rate appreciations as a means to 
disinflation.  
In the AD equations (Table 3), we notice that shocks have a high persistence: the sum of the 
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged dependent variables is in each case around 0.85. The 
effects of the real interest rate and of changes in the real exchange rate and in world demand 
are in each case well identified and significant. However, real interest rates affect AD in the 
Czech Republic only with a very long lag (first impact is after 5 quarters) whereas the 
competitiveness effect takes place with a shorter lag (3 quarters, same as in the other two 
countries) and is much stronger than in the other countries. Again, this corresponds well to 
the different exchange rate strategy adopted by the CNB. Finally, in the case of the Czech 
Republic we also found a small, significant effect of the government budget variable on AD.25 
Notice that, on the basis of the estimated AD equations, we may also compute the level of 
capacity utilization, which prevails in the long run, as a function of the real interest rate and 
of the rate of growth of world demand. This will be required for the simulations of the 
model. 
In  Table 4  the current exchange rate is shown to depend on the current interest rate 
differential and on the expected future exchange rate, augmented by a risk premium. The 
                                                 
25 bg measures the government balance (a positive value equal surplus) on GDP. Comparable data are 




AR1 coefficient on the risk premium varies between 0.45 in Hungary and 0.75 in the Czech 
Republic. Note that there is no constant component in the risk-premium for the Czech 
Republic. This may plausibly be linked to the fact that for a large part of the sample the CNB 
was successfully targeting the nominal exchange rate.26  
In the estimation, we imposed the restriction  g0/(1-g) = d0/[1-d1(1)] between equations (3) 
and (4). This implies equality in the long run between the risk premia in the UIP and interest 
rate equations. The restrictions are never rejected.27 
                                                 
26 For this reason, we also estimated an alternative version of the model, setting the exchange rate as 
an exogenous variable. Estimates of all the parameters in the other three equations are virtually 
identical. Results are available on request. Notice however that exchange rate targeting by the CNB 
has been suspended at the end of 1997. 
27 For the Czech Republic: c2 = 2.087 (p-value = 0.149). The additional restriction of both coefficient 
being equal to zero is also not rejected: c2 = 4.62, p-value = 0.099. For Hungary: c2 = 0.033 (p-value 
= 0.855). For Poland: c2 = 1.706 (p-value = 0.191). For Hungary and Poland we reject the zero 
coefficient restrictions; hence, in these cases we have a constant component of the risk premium, 




Table 2.    Aggregate supply    (Equation 1) 
 
Czech R.    Dpt  =  -1.227   +   Dp*t   + 0.657 yt-1 + 0.997 yt-3 + 0.695 (et-1 + p*t-1 - pt-1)     
          (0.318)      (0.339)     (0.317)    (0.112) 
Hungary     Dpt  =  0.055 + 0.872 Dpt-1 – 0.596 Dpt-4 + 0.392 Dpt-5 + 0.332 Dp*t-2 + 0.600 (yt-1 - yt-3) + 0.277 (et-1 + p*t-1 - pt-1)   
          (0.021) (0.091)       (0.131)          (0.113)       (-)         (0.18)           (0.104) 
Poland    Dpt  =  0.650 Dpt-1 + 0.199 Dpt-4 – 0.067 Dpt-5 + 0.217 Dp*t-1 + 0.457 (Dyt-1-Dyt-3 ) +   0.168 (Det-1  + Det-3 )/2    
                (0.042)    (0.011)      (0.013)    (-)      (0.158)      (0.040) 
 
   
Table 3.    Aggregate demand   (Equation 2) 
 
Czech R.    yt  =  0.073 + 0.536 yt-1 + 0.339 yt-3 – 0.122 [(it-5 – Et-5 Dpt-4)+(it-6 – Et-6 Dpt-5)]/2  +  
             (0.061) (0.091)       (0.086)       (0.040) 
              0.211 D(et-3 + p*t-3 - pt-3) + 0.223 Dwt + 0.238 Dwt-4 – 0.163 bgt-2       
               (0.081)        (0.045)   (0.050)       (0.110) 
Hungary     yt  =  0.082 + 0.516 yt-1 + 0.369 yt-2 – 0.122 [it-1 – Et-1 D4pt] + 0.115 D4(et-1 + p*t-1 - pt-1) + 0.205 D4wt-1   
           (0.036)  (0.137)      (0.128)         (0.052)             (0.046)           (0.068) 
Poland    yt  =  0.099 + 0.843 yt-1 – 0.047 (it-1–Et-1 Dpt) + 0.025 D(et-3+p*t-3-pt-3) + 0.133 Dwt-2   






Table 4.    Exchange rate    (Equation 3) 
 
Czech R.    et  =  Et et+1 - [it - i*t]/4 + jt ,  where:  jt  =  0.751 jt-1          
                                      (0.179) 
Hungary     et  =  Et et+1 - [it - i*t]/4 + jt ,  where  jt  = 0.0091 + 0.445 jt-1      
                            (-)     (0.152) 
Poland    et  =  Et et+1 - [it - i*t]/4 + jt ,  where:  jt  = 0.0054 + 0.660 jt-1    
                               (-)     (0.139) 
 
Table 5.    Interest rates       (Equation 4) 
 
Czech R.    D(it - i*t)  = -0.188 [it-1 - i*t-1] + 0.208 Et [Dpt+1 - Dp*t+1]             
                 (0.065)         (0.079) 
Hungary     D(it - i*t)  = -0.318 [it-1 - i*t-1 - 0.065] + 0.528 D[it-1 - i*t-1] + 0.335 D[it-3 - i*t-3] + 0.228 Et (Dpt+1 - Dp*t+1) 
              (0.066)       (0.016)    (0.116)      (0.125)      (0.065) 
Poland    D(it - i*t)  = -0.303 [it-1 - i*t-1 - 0.063] + 0.309 D[it-1 - i*t-1] - 0.006 D[it-3 - i*t-3] +0.213 [Dpt - Dp*t] - 0.224 D[Dpt-2 - Dp*t-2] 





In Table 5 the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates is shown to depend on 
an autoregressive component and on the expected inflation differential. For Poland, in 
particular, we found an equilibrium error-correction model, with the target interest rate 
differential linked to the expected future inflation differential, on the basis of the following 
relation:    it - i*t = 0.065 + 0.7 Et (Dpt+1 - Dp*t+1). 
In contrast to interest rate rules estimated for advanced industrial countries, we found that 
the rate of domestic capacity utilization does not help to explain the interest rate differential 
in any one of the three countries.28 
As regards the measurement of the anti-inflationary stance, we notice that there are in general 
two possibilities for a  non-accommodating policy. A traditional Taylor rule requires that 
interest rates react to inflation expectations with a coefficient higher than unity (at least in the 
long run). However, this does not apply to the case where a persistent policy of disinflation is 
required. For instance, if interest rates are set initially at a high enough level, relative to the 
rate of inflation, then the less they react to changes in the rate of inflation, the more aggressive the 
policy stance becomes. This observation clearly applies to all the three countries, as the 
estimates in Table 5 show.29  
Detailed diagnostic tests for all equations, including tests of parameter constancy, are 
presented in Appendix 3. Here we briefly present (Table 6) only on the results of the stability 
tests.30 The tests are reported for each equation and also for the full model. In general, 
evidence of instability is limited to the initial years in the sample. For the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
28 The fact that interest rates do not respond to the rate of capacity utilization (in reference to 
equation 4, d3 = 0) does not imply that central banks neglect the real costs of stabilization policy. 
Concern for these costs is embodied in the choice o f the speed of disinflation. That capacity 
utilization is not significant in the interest rate setting equations only implies that this policy is 
unchanged across the business cycle.  
29For Hungary and Poland, this point may easily be seen in reference to the estimated constant 
component of the risk premium. If we arbitrarily constrain this parameter to zero in the estimation of 
equations 3 and 4, then the resulting estimates of the (long-run) effect of expected inflation on 
interest rates becomes greater than unity (not reported, available on request). Although as we mention 
in the text this restriction is formally rejected, its imposition would not appreciably change the 
remaining parameter estimates. 
30 Tests have been conducted adding to each equation one dummy variable for each quarter tested for 
stability. Testing for predictive failure is then equivalent to testing for the joint significance of zero-
restrictions on the coefficients of the dummy variables. In this way we can test for predictive failure 
both in the first and last part of the sample. We present the p-values of the F-version  of the chi-
square Wald test, as the F statistic is expected to have better small sample properties than the 
(asymptotic) chi-square statistic. Notice that in any case the results of these tests have to be 




instability originates from eqs. 1 (AS) and 4 (interest rate rule). For Hungary, from eqs. 2 
(AD) and 4. For Poland, from eq 1. Only for Poland there is some evidence of instability also 
at the end of the sample, in particular for the year 1999, in eqs. 2 (AS) and 3 (ER).  
 
Table 6.  Stability Tests  
Country  Period  eq. 1  eq. 2  eq. 3  eq. 4  System 
1993  0.0061  0.7548  0.9777  0.0080  0.0243  Czech 
Republic  2000  0.9920  0.6872  0.7635  0.9892  0.9845 
1991  0.3696  0.0024  0.0147  0.5503  0.0074 
1991-1992  0.3859  0.0002  0.1003  0.0370  0.0039 
1999-2000  0.9101  0.6205  0.9875  0.7247  0.9581 
 
Hungary 
2000  0.9431  0.9374  0.8462  0.4980  0.9646 
1991  0.4642  0.5642  0.1834  0.0757  0.1848 
1991-1992  0.0108  0.7566  0.2801  0.2006  0.0756 
1999-2000  0.7383  0.0030  0.0470  0.9728  0.0652 
 
Poland 
2000  0.9597  0.6085  0.1696  0.9142  0.7976 
Notes. Reported values are P-values of the F version of the second Chow test, for the 
relevant period. Test for year 2000 include five quarters, up to 2001.1. 
See Tables A.6.1, A.6.2, A.6.3 for other details. 
 
Overall, while it is not surprising that we should find instability in the first years of the 
transition process it is instead quite comforting31 to find that the estimated equations are in 
general remarkably stable in the most recent years.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
series systems, Chow-type tests have distorted size (i.e. they reject far too often the null hypothesis of 
stability).   





5.  Simulation results 
In order to examine the long run implications of the estimated models, we have simulated 
them outside the sample of estimation. Any solution to the model must take into account the 
forward-looking nature of the exchange rate in equations (3). This requires in each case the 
choice of an appropriate terminal condition. We have assumed that the real exchange rate 
converges, at the end of the solution period, to the long run value, computed on the basis of 
the  reduced form, steady state solution. T his allows us to find a consistent expectations 
solution to the model. In particular, the steady state solution is formulated in terms of the level 
of the real exchange rate for the Czech Republic and Hungary. For Poland instead the 
terminal condition only imposes that the real exchange rate becomes constant32. For the three 
countries, in addition, convergence of the iterative procedure is ensured by the existence of a 
steady state solution for the inflation rate, capacity utilization and domestic interest rates.  
To simulate the model outside the period of estimation, we also need to forecast the three 
exogenous (foreign) variables. To this purpose, we assumed the following long run values: 
Dp* = 0.024 ; Dw = 0.072 ;  i* = 0.043.33 
Finally, for Hungary and Poland we also need to forecast the evolution of the constant 
component of the risk premium,  g0 , outside the estimation sample. In the simulations 
reported below, we assumed a decay parameter equal to 0.6.34  
We simulated the model from 2001.2 to 2020.4. 35 In Fig. 1.1 we plot the point forecasts from 
a deterministic simulations for the Czech Republic, in Fig.1.2 for Hungary and Fig. 1.3 for 
Poland. In each case we also add a forecasting interval (– one forecasting error).36  
                                                 
32 The level is estimated at –0.213 for the Czech Republic, and –0.200 for Hungary. Note that in 
Golinelli and Rovelli (2001) the corresponding estimate for Hungary was –4.635, but this was due to a 
different normalization of the equation. The effective difference between the two terminal conditions 
for Hungary is about 7%. For Poland, the value at which the real exchange rate becomes constant is –
0.340. 
33 This is the same as in Golinelli and Rovelli (2001). In addition, for the Czech model, we set the 
fiscal impulse, bg ,equal to zero in the long run. 
34   We did two checks on this assumption. First we assumed a decay parameter of g0 equal to 0.8. 
Second, we re-estimated the model imposing from the outset the restriction g0 = 0, and simulated the 
model on the basis of the new estimated parameters. In both cased the simulated path of the 
endogenous variables was very insignificantly different from the first simulations (results available on 
request). 
35 We performed the simulations with a Fair and Taylor (1983) scheme, without the automatic 
extension of the time horizon, using Eviews 4. The simulation results are unaffected when moving 





























































The three sets of the simulations attract similar comments. In general, we accept that our 
models do not yield particular insights on the evolution of output or of the real exchange 
rates in the long run. As we explained in Section 3, the steady state values of these variables 
are computed from the estimated parameters of the equations for aggregate demand (eq.1) 
and from the cointegrating vector for the real exchange rate (Tables A.5.1, -2, -3 in Appendix 
2). This implies that we do not take into account the evolution of potential output over time, 
nor the effects of productivity on the real exchange rate. These limitations cannot be avoided 
in the context of our model.  
We now move on to more specific comments. As regards the continuation of disinflation, for 
the Czech Republic, as the process has been almost completed, there is not much to be said, 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 Intervals have been obtained performing a stochastic simulation of the model (1000 repetitions). 
The unknown equation errors were measured by pseudo-random values, extracted from a distribution 




except that there might still be a few bumps at the end of the story. For Hungary and Poland 
the graphs obviously point out that disinflation is slightly slower, but the point forecast 
indicate that inflation should reach 4% by 2003-04 in each country, although the interval of 
the forecasts is wider for Poland.  
We were instead surprised, in a negative way, that the path of nominal interest rates is in each 
case so imprecisely defined. For instance, the entire range of values between 0 and 9% is 
encompassed in the forecasting interval for the Czech Republic. Similar or slightly wider 
intervals apply to the other countries. As the interest rate rules were estimated with sufficient 
precision (Tables A.6.1, -2, -3 in Appendix 3), this behavior must probably be attributed to 
the high persistence of the autoregressive risk premium (See Table 4). 
 



























































































































5.1  A more aggressive policy stance  
How would the path of the endogenous variables changed if the three central banks had 
conducted a more aggressive policy against inflation since 1993? To answer this question, we 
have compared the baseline simulation of the model from 1993 to 2020, with an alternative, 
where the response of nominal interest rates to the expected inflation differential has been 
increased relative to the estimated value. In particular, we set the long run elasticity of the 
nominal interest rate differential to the inflation differential to approximately 1.6 for all three 
countries.37 The effects of this more aggressive policy stance on the variables of the model are 
plotted in Figures 2.1-2.338. 
                                                 
37 In particular, we multiplied by 1.5 the impact parameter in the equation 4 for the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (which imply long-run effects respectively equal to 1.662 and 1.624), and by 1.8 the 
parameter for Poland (1.627 in the long-run).   
38 The right columns plots report the differences between the simulated baseline policy and the 
simulated more aggressive policy. Interval estimates of one standard error where obtained by running 




Since the estimated model for Poland does not yield a direct solution for the level of the long-
run real exchange rate, and the terminal condition is simply set at that level where the real 
exchange rate becomes constant, one consequence of simulating an alternative policy for 
Poland is that the terminal value of the real exchange rate will be changed accordingly. For 
this reason, the large increase in the “proactiveness” of the NBP towards the inflation 
differential implies a real appreciation of the exchange rate with respect to the baseline 
solution.39  
Briefly, the other main results of these simulations are the following. For each country, we 
find that a more aggressive stance would deliver a benefit in terms of faster disinflation. For 
the Czech Republic, inflation would have been about 4% lower in 1995-96, but the 
subsequent resurgence of inflation in 1997 would not have been avoided. Thus, the induced 
lower levels of output ( -1% for about five years) would appear as a net cost, with no 
permanent gain.  
For Hungary, the gains on the inflation front are more pronounced and permanent (as 
inflation drops by about 12% in 1994-96), but the output costs are also large (-4% in 1994-95, 
and then gradually fading away, but not disappearing until 2001). Interestingly, most of the 
effects would seem to come through the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which 
approaches much faster its steady-state value40.  
For Poland, the behavior of inflation is similar to that of Hungary, but the costs to output are 
more short-lived, since in any case the economy ends up in the recession of 1998-99, which is 
almost identical in either policy scenario. In the more aggressive scenario, the path of nominal 
interest rates would have been almost unchanged (apart from the obvious initial increase in 
1993-94). The real exchange rate would end up permanently more appreciated by about 1.5%. 
Overall, these simulations point out that faster disinflation would have been possible, but that 
in each case it would have imposed additional output costs. We must stress that these results 
are the outcome of somewhat mechanical counterfactual simulations, which certainly are not 
immune to the Lucas’ (1976) critique, and thus must be interpreted with caution. In 
particular, it is quite possible that some of the estimated parameters are not deep, i.e. they 
                                                 
39 For Hungary and Poland, in these alternative simulations we used parameters estimated subject to 
the restriction that the constant risk premium is zero (See the discussion of this point in footnote 28). 
This is consistent with the fact that an increased proactiveness of the central bank would most likely 
increase credibility and hence result in reduced risk premia. Moreover, this avoids the need to set an 
arbitrary path of decay for the exogenous component of the risk premium. 




might not be independent of the policy rule, which the monetary authority is expected to 
follow. For instance, it is possible that, if the central bank credibly announces a more resolute 
path of disinflation, the degree of persistence of inflation (the a1(L) polynomial in eq.1) and of 
the risk premium (the autoregressive parameter, g, in eq. 4) might have been lower. If this 
were the case, then it is also possible (but by no means unambiguously necessary) that the 
results of the simulations indicate an upper bound for the output loss resulting from a faster 
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6.   Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that a simple open macroeconomic model, with forward-
looking inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately characterize the relationships 
between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the exchange rate during the 
course of transition. These findings go against a widespread skepticism, which permeated a 
large part of previous research on these issues. 
We have specified and estimated three small, similar models for the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, for the period 1991-2000. In our view of the transmission mechanism, domestic 
interest rates are at the center of the analysis, and their role is compatible in principle with 
different strategies concerning the exchange rate policy. Accordingly, we have characterized 
empirically the policy rules prevailing in each country, and assessed the relative importance of 
the interest rate channel (on aggregate demand) and the exchange rate channel (which affects 
both aggregate demand and supply) in determining the path of (dis)inflation. From this point 
of view, it is interesting to observe that the effect of the real exchange rate on the evolution 
of inflation is much more direct in the case of the Czech Republic, relative to the other 
countries. This corresponds well to the fact that the CNB consistently placed a greater 
emphasis, relative to the other two central banks, on the role of real exchange appreciations 
as a means to disinflation. Similarly, although the effects of the real interest rate and of 
changes in the real exchange rate on aggregate demand are in each case well identified and 
significant, we also found that in the Czech Republic real interest rates affect demand only 
with a very long lag, whereas the competitiveness effect takes place with a shorter lag and is 
much stronger than in the other countries: again, this corresponds well to the different 
exchange rate strategy adopted by the CNB.  
Apart from these quantitative differences, the models are broadly similar from the qualitative 
point of view. This provides an important crosscheck on the validity of our modeling 
framework, and suggests that “orthodox”41 relations between macroeconomic variables were 
already effective soon after the beginning of transition. The diagnostic tests on the estimated 
equations also suggest some evidence of instability, but this is limited to the first few years 
after the start of transition.  
This econometric evidence has two main implications for the current debate on monetary 
policy in transition. First, since we show that a well specified mechanism of policy 
transmission and of the inflation process is at work and can be kept under control by 
                                                 




appropriately setting the level of domestic interest rates, this provides strong support for the 
feasibility of an inflation targeting (IT) strategy (and indeed for other structured strategies of 
monetary policy).  
Second, since we show that this mechanism has been operating for quite some time and 
under different characterizations of the policy regime, we believe that this underlines the 
basic continuity between IT and other strategies of monetary policy. We support the idea that 
IT is best thought of as a policy framework, compatible with a range of policy strategies. In 
this context, IT is designed to serve a number of politico-economic functions, signaling the 
stance of the central bank vis-à-vis other actors on the macroeconomic scene and suggesting 
an appropriate nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This becomes valuable especially 
once the pre-announcement of a rate of crawl of the exchange rate can no longer play a 
central role in the strategy for disinflation, as the latter has been almost completed. From this 
point of view, IT emerges as the natural follower to a strategy of crawling band, in particular 
during a process of accession to the EU and EMU.  
Finally, we have also used the estimated model to simulate the continuation of disinflation in 
the coming years, and to evaluate the effects of a more aggressive stance of monetary policy, 
if it had been adopted in the past. Unsurprisingly, we found that in the Czech Republic, 
which is the first country to complete disinflation in our sample, a more aggressive policy 
would have mostly induced negative output effects. On the other hand the counterfactual 
evidence is more dubious for the other countries. Overall, we do not place too much 
confidence in the results of counterfactual simulations, as we cannot be sure how “deep” our 
estimated parameters are, in the sense of Lucas (1976). However, we also believe that, if a 
more aggressive policy stance goes together with more credibility and hence less persistence, 
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APPENDIX 1: Data description and sources 
Table A1 - Basic data  
Label  Country  Period, from-to  Description  Source 
  Czech Republic  1991.1 -  Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1  MEI 
P  Hungary  1989.1 -  Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1  MEI 
  Poland  1989.1 - 1994.4 
1995.1 - 
Consumer prices (interpolator series) 
Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1 
IFS 
MEI 
PGE  Germany  1989.1 -  Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1  MEI 
PUS  United States  1989.1 -  Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1  MEI 
  Czech Republic  1991.2 -    MEI 
Y  Hungary  1991.1 -  Capacity Utilisation (Business tendency surveys), %  MEI 
  Poland  1989.1 -    MEI 
  Czech Republic  1991.1 -   CK/$ exchange rate, quarterly average  MEI 
$  Hungary  1989.1 - 1990.4 
1991.1 - 
Forint official rate (interpolator series) 




Poland  1989.1 - 1990.4 
1991.1 - 
Zloty official rate (interpolator series) 
Z/$ exchange rate, quarterly average 
IFS 
MEI 
D  Germany  1989.1 -  D-Mark/$ exchange rate, quarterly average  MEI 
  Czech Republic  1991.1 - 1992.4 
1993.1 - 
Avg. interest rate, 12-mth dep., (interpolator series) 
3-month PRIBOR, % 
LAM 
MEI 
R3m  Hungary  1989.1 - 1990.4 
1991.1 - 
Treasury bill rate, (interpolator series) 




Poland  1989.1 - 1992.2 
1992.3 - 
Treasury bill rate, (interpolator series) 
3 month Treasury bill rate, % 
IFS 
MEI 
WT  World  1989.1 -  World Trade in manufactures (BN 1995 $)  MEI 
BG  Czech Republic  1993.1 -  Public deficit (-) or surplus (BN CK)  IFS 
YU  Czech Republic  1993.1 -  GDP at current prices(BN CK)  MEI 
RGE  Germany  1989.1 -  Call Money Rate, % p.a.  MEI 
RUS  United States  1989.1 -  3-month Certificates of Deposit, % p.a.  MEI 
MEI = OECD, Main Economic Indicators; IFS = IMF, International Financial Statistics; LAM = 
Univ. of Gdansk data.  
Significant seasonal patterns have been removed using the Tramo/Seats procedure, see Gomez and 
Maravall (1997).  





Table A2 - The weights of the foreign variables 
country  periods  wUS,t  wGE,t 
 
Czech Republic 
before 1993, May 
from 1993, May to 1997, May 









before 1994, May 
from 1994, June to 1999 December 









before 1991, May 
from 1991, June to 2000, March 







Table A3 - Model variables 
Label  Definition  Description 
pt  log(Pt)  domestic price logs (1995 = 0) 
D Dpt  4 (pt - pt-1)  domestic inflation rate 
PdotGE,t  PGE,t/PGE,t-1 –1   Germany inflation rate 
PdotUS,t  PUS,t/PUS,t-1 –1   US inflation rate 
p
*
t  log{Pj = 1, t [1 + (wGE,j PdotGE,j + wUS,j PdotUS,j)]}  foreign price logs (1995 = 0) 
D Dp
*
t  4 (p*t - p*t -1)  foreign inflation rate 
$dott  $t/$t-1 – 1  Dollar exchange rate % change 
Ddott  ($t/Dt)/($t-1/Dt-1) – 1  D-Mark exchange rate % change 
et  log{Pj = 1, t [1 + (wGE,j Ddotj + wUS,j $dotj)]}  log nominal exchange rate,1995=0 
  et + p*t -pt  log real exchange rate,1995 = 0 
yt  Y/100  capacity utilization ratio 
it  R3m/100  domestic interest rate 
D Dwt  4 log(WTt/WTt-1)  world demand  
bgt  BGt/YUt  government balance on GDP 
i
*
t  wGE,t RGE,t + wUS,t RUS,t  foreign interest rate 
Variables used in the models are in bold and italic. Variable definitions are the same for all countries 
The data set used for estimation is available at: http://www.spbo.unibo.it/pais/golinelli/macro.html 
 
APPENDIX 2: Unit roots and cointegration properties  
Unit root analysis. Table A4 reports Dickey and Fuller (1979) unit root test statistics 
(column ADF). The order of the test (column k) was selected by following the general (max 




models are set as indicated in the column model. Phillips and Perron (1988) test results (with 
West truncation lag = 3) are reported in the column PP. 
The sample period is 1993.1-2001.1 for the Czech Republic, 1991.1 2001.1 for Hungary and 
Poland. Overall, the variables examined are at most I(1).  
Table A4 also reports tests for simple combinations between I(1) variables: if the unit root 
null hypothesis is rejected, the corresponding I(1) variables are cointegrated. As real ex post 
short-term interest rates are stationary, both foreign and domestic nominal interest rates are 
(1,  -1) cointegrated with inflation. On the contrary, the real exchange rate is I(1) in all 
countries. 
Table A4 – Unit root tests  
    Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland 
(
a)  mod  ADF (
b)  k  PP (
b)  ADF (
b)  k  PP (
b)  ADF (
b)  k  PP (
b) 
pt  c, t  -2.603  0  -2.572  0.592  4  -0.088  -1.909  5  -4.455** 
Dpt  c  -3.876**  0  -3.746**  -1.348  4  -1.890  -1.624  4  -2.063 
p
*
t  c, t  -3.234  3  -3.160  -2.218  3  -2.902  -2.109  3  -3.016 
Dp
*
t  c  -1.921  1  -3.409*  -1.922  2  -3.828**  -2.934*  2  -4.599** 
Dpt -Dp
*
t  c  -3.987**  0  -3.869**  -1.587  4  -1.744  -5.863**  3  -1.874 
et  c, t  -3.141  1  -2.209  -0.492  3  -0.395  0.573  0  0.500 
Det  c  -4.937**  2  -4.726**  -5.505**  0  -5.685**  -2.027  1  -3.341* 
et+p
*
t -pt  c, t  -2.934  3  -3.422  -1.830  3  -2.260  -2.635  4  -4.876** 
D(et+p
*
t -pt)  c  -4.367**  2  -4.459**  -4.700**  2  -8.013**  -6.204**  3  -4.542** 
yt  c  -1.460  0  -1.189  -0.908  4  -0.607  -2.274  2  -1.835 
Dyt  c  -5.709**  1  -6.768**  -2.691  3  -7.277**  -5.130**  0  -5.177** 
Dwt  c  -4.499**  4  -3.136*  -4.155*  3  -3.503*  -4.155**  3  -3.503* 
bgt  c  -4.800**  0  -4.826**  -  -  -  -  -  - 
it  c  -1.272  0  -1.381  -2.769  3  -1.482  -2.287  5  -1.359 
Dit  c  -5.850**  0  -5.850**  -3.462*  3  -3.964**  -4.933**  4  -4.458** 
it -Dpt+1  c  -7.476**  0  -6.732**  -5.618**  3  -3.174*  -3.629**  3  -6.592** 
i
*
t  c  -2.045  1  -2.001  -2.136  5  -3.003*  -1.495  4  -2.700 
Di
*





t+1  c  -4.289**  0  -4.453**  -5.036**  0  -5.030**  -5.527**  0  -5.547** 
(a) Data Labels are in Table A3. 
(b) MacKinnon critical values for 1% and 5% rejection of the unit root null:  
-3.60 and -2.93, for models with constant and without trend (c);  
-4.20 and -3.52, for models with constant and trend: (c, t);  
* and ** respectively indicate 5% and 1% rejection of the unit root null.  
Cointegration analysis. In order to reach a long-run-balanced data representation for each 
equation, integrated variables must be cointegrated. Since cointegration is invariant if we add 
redundant variables to an irreducible cointegrating relation (see Davidson, 1998), we have 
applied the Johansen (1995) cointegration approach to subsets of variables to save on the 
number of parameters to be estimated (a very similar approach is followed by Juselius, 1992).  
In the last two equations of the structural models (the UIP and the interest rate rule), the 
balanced representation of the relationships among the exchange rate, interest rates and 




interest rates are stationary. Results in Table A4 satisfy these conditions as a whole, while the 
cointegration results in the aggregate supply and demand equations will be discussed 




For the  Czech Republic, the AS equation implies a balanced representation between 
domestic and foreign inflation rates, and between the real interest rate and the rate of capacity 
utilization. Table A4 suggests that the inflation differential Dpt -Dp
*
t  is stationary. In addition, 
the Johansen trace test in Table A5.1 detects rank = 2 in a VAR(4) model for the four at most 
I(1) variables: (Dpt ; et+p
*
t -pt ; yt ; Dp
*
t  ). The identification restrictions on the two long run 
relationships are not rejected.  
For the AD equation, Table A5.1 reports cointegration results between the only two I(1) 
variables: (yt ; it ) in a VAR(5) model conditional to past values of world demand, inflation 
rate, public deficit on GDP, and real exchange rate. Given  the relevant number of lags 
necessary to obtain white noise residuals, the long run relationship is not efficiently estimated. 
The weak exogeneity of the nominal interest rate is largely not rejected; this supports the 
irrelevance of capacity utilization in explaining the cyclical path of the nominal interest rate in 
the interest rate rule equation.  
Table A5.1 – Czech Republic. Cointegration between the I(1) variables 
 
AS equation 
Cointegration rank test between (Dpt ; et+p
*
t -pt ; yt ; Dp
*
t  ) 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None *   0.776517   92.66400   53.12   60.16 
At most 1 *   0.589486   43.21614   34.91   41.07 
At most 2   0.273146   13.83477   19.96   24.60 
At most 3   0.095349   3.306804    9.24   12.97 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at 1% level 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
Dp = 0.067 + Dp
*
    e +p
* 
 - p = 1.0154  -  1.326  y 
       (0.018)                    (0.313)     (0.384) 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
Chi-square(3)  1.979 
P-value  0.577 
AD equation 
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it  ) variables: 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None *   0.557283   27.20282   19.96   24.60 
At most 1   0.009457   0.313581    9.24   12.97 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% level 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
y = 0.827  -  0.266  i   
      (0.058)    (0.278) 
LR test for it weak exogeneity restriction (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  0.065 




Hungary. In the AS equation, we found a cointegration relationship between the I(1) triplet 
(Dpt ; Dp
*
t  ; et+p
*
t -pt ). Results in Table A5.2 suggest that the long run inflation differential is 
explained by the level of the real exchange rate (the corresponding restrictions are not 
rejected).  
In the AD equation, we detect rank = 2 in a VAR(5) model for (yt ; it ; Dpt ), conditional to 
past values of world demand growth and past variations of the real exchange rate. The results, 
reported in Table A5.2, can also be interpreted (and identified) as a long run demand curve, 
where the level of the capacity utilization depends on the level of the real interest rates. As in 
the Czech case, the weak exogeneity of the interest rate is not rejected. 
Table A5.2 – Hungary. Cointegration between the I(1) variables 
 
AS equation 
Cointegration rank test between (Dpt ; Dp
*
t  ; et+p
*
t -pt) variables: 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None *   0.392819   37.53525   34.91   41.07 
At most 1   0.259873   17.57812   19.96   24.60 
At most 2   0.129353   5.540764    9.24   12.97 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
Dp - Dp
*  =  0.125  +  1.385  (e +p
*
 -p ) 
                     (0.024)     (0.303) 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  0.034 
P-value  0.854 
AD equation 
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it  ; Dpt ) variables: 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None **   0.532740   53.40690   34.91   41.07 
At most 1 *   0.355440   22.21129   19.96   24.60 
At most 2   0.097469   4.204626    9.24   12.97 
** (*) denotes rejections of the hypothesis at the 1% (5%) levels 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% level 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
y = 0.682  -  0.769  (i  - Dp)  
      (0.027)    (0.511) 
LR test for binding restriction (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)   3.075 




Poland. The specification of the AS equation implies a static long run solution, where the 
inflation rate and changes in the nominal exchange rate, both I(1), are cointegrated. The 
stationarity of the real exchange rate in differences (reported in Table A4) supports the 
cointegration of the supply equation. This result is  confirmed by the cointegration 
experiments in Table A5.3, where a relationship in differences between the inflation 
differential and the nominal exchange is detected, and the corresponding identification 
restriction is not rejected.42 As expected, in the demand equation there are two cointegrated 
relationships between (yt ; it ; Dpt ), all I(1). In addition, as shown in Table A5.3, the long run 
relationship between capacity utilization and the real ex post interest rate (the latter being 
weakly exogenous for the estimation of the long run demand equation) is identified.  
Table A5.3 – Poland. Cointegration between the I(1) variables 
 
AS equation 
Cointegration rank test between (Dpt ; Det ; Dp
*
t  ) variables: 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None *   0.428637   36.09319   34.91   41.07 
At most 1   0.185024   13.14424   19.96   24.60 
At most 2   0.109520   4.755763    9.24   12.97 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
Dp - Dp
*  =  0.023  +  0.622  De 
                     (0.047)     (0.278) 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  0.329 
P-value  0.566 
AD equation 
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it -Dpt ) variables: 
null  eigenvalue  Trace  5% c.v.  1% c.v. 
None *   0.276075   22.57671   19.96   24.60 
At most 1   0.193033   9.007850    9.24   12.97 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% levels 
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets): 
y = 0.729  -  0.851  (i  - Dp)  
      (0.027)    (0.315) 
LR test for (it -Dpt) weak exogeneity restriction (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  0.518 
P-value  0.472 
                                                 
42 Note also that (as implied by the first-order integrated real exchange rate in Table A4) the long run elasticity of 




APPENDIX 3: Diagnostic tests and model performance  
Tab. A6.1 – Diagnostic tests, Czech Republic  
  equation 1  equation 2  equation 3  equation 4 
S.E. of regression  0.0408  0.0122  0.0253  0.0181 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.055  2.163  2.458  1.913 
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (
a)  0.4395  0.5217  0.1340  0.9973 
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (
a)  0.8661  0.3929  0.0300  0.8629 
Heteroskedasticity (
b)  0.0115  0.2024  0.0266  0.0343 
ARCH(1) (
c)  0.2615  0.9506  0.4282  0.4917 
ARCH(4) (
c)  0.1835  0.8056  0.9363  0.9977 
Normality (
d)  0.6562  0.6338  0.0037  0.0422 
Parameter constancy, 1993 (
e)  0.0061  0.7548  0.9777  0.0080 
Parameter constancy, 2000 (
f)  0.9920  0.6872  0.7635  0.9892 
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation 
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets 
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
(e) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1993.1 to 1993.4; system P_value = 0.0243 
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 2000.1 to 2001.1; system P_value = 0.9845 
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Tab. A6.2 – Diagnostic tests, Hungary 
  equation 1  equation 2  equation 3  equation 4 
S.E. of regression  0.0224  0.0137  0.0241  0.0195 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.245  1.924  1.673  1.943 
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (
a)  0.3260  0.8967  0.9030  0.9530 
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (
a)  0.1852  0.0752  0.4848  0.7301 
Heteroskedasticity (
b)  0.1815  0.1000  0.7265  0.4693 
ARCH(1) (
c)  0.6514  0.5128  0.0551  0.8961 
ARCH(4) (
c)  0.4008  0.0410  0.1364  0.0323 
Normality (
d)  0.3494  0.3003  0.0130  0.0009 
Parameter constancy, 1991 (
e)  0.3696  0.0024  0.0147  0.5503 
Parameter constancy, 1991-92 (
e)  0.3859  0.0002  0.1003  0.0370 
Parameter constancy, 1999-00 (e)  0.9101  0.6205  0.9875  0.7247 
Parameter constancy, 2000 (e)  0.9431  0.9374  0.8462  0.4980 
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation 
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets 
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
(e)  P-values of the F version of the second Chow test for all the quarters in the year(s); system 
P_values: 0.0074 (1991), 0.0039 (1991-1992) 
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1999.1 (2000.1) to 2001.1; system P_values: 
0.9581 (1999-00), 0.9646 (2000) 
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Tab. A6.3 – Diagnostic tests, Poland 
  equation 1  equation 2  equation 3  equation 4 
S.E. of regression  0.0207  0.0117  0.0309  0.0143 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.695  2.393  2.391  2.013 
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (
a)  0.8589  0.1983  0.0780  0.9011 
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (
a)  0.6318  0.5742  0.2025  0.7959 
Heteroskedasticity (
b)  0.8066  0.8989  0.3630  0.0343 
ARCH(1) (
c)  0.3060  0.6531  0.2312  0.2592 
ARCH(4) (
c)  0.6691  0.9527  0.3678  0.4122 
Normality (
d)  0.0673  0.0000  0.8527  0.9754 
Parameter constancy, 1991 (
e)  0.4642  0.5642  0.1834  0.0757 
Parameter constancy, 1991-92 (
e)  0.0108  0.7566  0.2801  0.2006 
Parameter constancy, 1999-00 (e)  0.7383  0.0030  0.0470  0.9728 
Parameter constancy, 2000 (e)  0.9597  0.6085  0.1696  0.9142 
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation 
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets 
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
(e)  P-values of the F version of the second Chow test for all the quarters in the year(s); system 
P_values: 0.1848 (1991), 0.0756 (1991-1992) 
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1999.1 (2000.1) to 2001.1; system P_values: 
0.0652 (1999-00), 0.7976 (2000) 
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